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The Rule of Non-Inquiry and the Impact of Human
Rights on Extradition Law
John Quigley*
Extradition law has traditionally reflected the character of international law as law between states.' Extradition law developed to
provide procedures whereby a person suspected of a crime but who
was in another state could be surrendered to the first state for prosecution. The aim was to vindicate the right of the requesting state to
prosecute persons who had violated its laws. The basic legal obligation was thus at the interstate level.
The interests of the individual being surrendered were obviously at stake, however. Thus, certain safeguards for the extraditee
were introduced in extradition law. In spite of this development, the
basic purpose of the law still was to determine whether the requesting state had a right to the surrender, not whether the extraditee had
a right not to be surrendered.
Recent litigation has focused attention on the rights of the extraditee. This development has occurred with the emergence of a
law of human rights that provides individuals with an extensive array
of rights under international law. Human rights law, which emerged
as positive law in the mid-twentieth century, departed from the traditional state-oriented character of international law by positing that
individuals possess rights in their capacity as individuals.
The issue of the human rights of the individual has been raised
in situations in which there is reason to believe that the rights of the
extraditee will be violated by the requesting state. The requested
state may be presented with evidence that the extraditee would be
tried under procedures that lack fundamental fairness, that he may
be tortured during interrogation, or that he may be subjected to
cruel or degrading punishment.
This Article explores the interests of the extraditee in such situaProfessor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B., M.A., Harvard University. The
author was an expert witness, called by the extraditee, in Ahmad v. Wigen, discussed infra.
The author is grateful to Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni for consultation and source
material.
I "State," unless otherwise indicated, is used in this Article in the meaning of "nation state."
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tions and raises the question of the role of human rights law in a
court's decision about extradition.
I.

Extradition Procedure and the Rule of Non-Inquiry

International extradition in the United States is handled by the
federal government, not by the states. 2 The United States has a right
to extradition of a person from abroad and a foreign state has a right
to extradition from the United States only if there exists an extradition treaty, typically bilateral, that requires the surrender in the particular situation.3 If a foreign state wants the United States to
surrender a person who is in the United States, a federal court examines the request.
A hearing is held by a federal magistrate, who decides the question of extraditability on the basis of the applicable extradition
treaty. 4 The magistrate must decide whether the crime charged is
one covered by the extradition treaty, which would typically mean
serious, non-political offenses. 5 The magistrate also must decide if
the offense involved is an offense under United States law, since,
under extradition treaties, states typically may seek extradition only
if the offense is deemed a crime by both the requesting and the requested states. 6 The magistrate must decide whether the person the
authorities have identified is the one the requesting state has named
as its suspect. 7 Finally, the magistrate must determine whether the
requesting state has probable cause to believe that the person has
committed the offense in question. 8 Should the magistrate make a
finding of extraditability, the Secretary of State must decide whether
to surrender the extraditee to the requesting state. 9 A magistrate's
finding of extraditability is reviewable by a federal district judge on
application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.10
The issue of anticipated mistreatment of the extraditee has long
troubled the federal courts in extradition cases. Extraditees on occasion have argued that, if surrendered to the requesting state, they
will be treated in a manner that would violate their rights. They may
assert that their lives would be in danger in the prisons of the requesting state and that the requesting state will not ensure their
safety. They may assert that they will be tortured in the requesting
2 U.S. v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 414 (1886).
3 Id. at 414-15; Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258, 259-60 (6th Cir. 1957); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3184 (1988).

4 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988).
5 Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287-88 (1933).

6 Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 311-12 (1921).
7 Exparte La Mantia, 206 F. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
8 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988); Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 314-15 (1921).
9 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1988); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 304 (1933).

10 Peroffv. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
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state, or that their trials will be conducted in violation of due
process.
Confronted with these arguments, the federal courts have typically ordered extradition. Some have said that the issue is irrelevant,
an approach that has come to be called the rule of non-inquiry, that
is, that the federal court will not inquire into the legality of the proceedings that can be anticipated in the requesting state. Some federal courts, however, have addressed the extraditee's argument and
have taken evidence on his allegation of expected mistreatment.
These cases suggest that, if the extraditee's rights would be violated
in a serious way, the courts might bar extradition.
A case frequently cited in contemporary cases involving these
issues is Neely v. Henkel," decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1901. In that case, a person being extradited to Cuba on
charges of embezzlement from the Cuban postal department argued
that, if surrendered, he would be tried in Cuba on the basis of procedures that did not conform to guarantees found in the United States
Constitution. He said that Cuba had no habeas corpus protection,
no prohibition against bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, and no
provision for trial by jury. 1 2 The Court replied that "those provisions have no relation to crimes committed without the jurisdiction
of the United States against the laws of a foreign country."' 3 The
Court said that even where the extraditee is a United States citizen,
the criminal procedure safeguards of the United States Constitution
do not apply. 14 United States citizenship, it said, does not give the
extraditee a right to "a trial in any other mode than that allowed to
its own people by the country whose laws he has violated and from
15
whose justice he has fled."'
In Glucksman v. Henkel,16 a 1911 United States Supreme Court
case, an extraditee sought by Russia for forgery said that the government of Russia did not have sufficient evidence of his guilt. 17 Finding probable cause, the Court said that it would not speculate
whether Russia could produce enough evidence to convict. The
Court concluded that it was "bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair."' 8
The issue that first gave cause for concern involved requests for
the extradition of persons who had been convicted in absentia in the
requesting state, a practice permitted in a number of European
11

180 U.S. 109 (1901).

12 Id. at 122.
'3

Id.

14 Id. at
15 Id.

123.

16 221 U.S. 508 (1911).
17 Id. at 511.
18 Id. at 512.
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states. Under extradition procedure, a person already convicted
could be extradited on presentation of proof of the conviction, without presentation of evidence.' 9 The United States courts were uncertain whether to order extradition on presentation of proof of a
conviction in absentia, or whether to require a showing of probable
cause.
The difficulty with in absentia convictions was resolved in the
20
late nineteenth century by requiring a showing of probable cause.
The Secretary of State, in response to a request from Great Britain
for divulgence of United States policy on the matter, enclosed a letter written by the United States Attorney in New York, indicating
that extradition would be ordered in such cases, but that proof of
probable cause would be required. 2 ' The letter indicated the rationale for requiring proof of probable cause by stating that "[t]he return
of persons whose presence for other reasons might be desired in a
foreign country, could be secured with much ease if the record of a
3
conviction par contumace22 was sufficient for that purpose.""1
The in absentia conviction issue arose frequently on requests
from Italy under the United States-Italy extradition treaty of 1868.24
Italian courts were, at that time, permitted to convict persons in absentia, and, on a number of occasions, Italy requested the extradition
of persons so convicted. Though the federal courts have consistently
maintained that in absentia convictions will not bar extradition, they
nevertheless have treated such cases cautiously.
In Ex parte Fudera,2 5 for example, the court refused to order extradition of a man convicted in absentia of murder in Italy.2 6 The
evidence presented to the court consisted of the oral testimony of a
police officer who investigated the case. 2 7 The court characterized
this evidence as hearsay and found it insufficient to establish prob28
able cause.
19 Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459, 461 (1959).
20 4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 52, 130 (1942).
21 1 J. MOORE, A TREATISE ON ExTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 133 (1891).

22 Par contumace means in absentia.
23 1 J. MOORE, supra note 21, at 133 (1891) (quoting letter of Feb. 20, 1866).
24 Convention for the Surrender of Criminals, Mar. 23, 1868, United States-Italy, 15
Stat. 629, T.S. No. 174, amended by Supplementary Convention, 1885, 24 Stat. 1001, T.S.
No. 181.
25 162 F. 591 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908), appeal dismissed, 219 U.S. 589 (1911).
26 Id. at 592.
27 d.
28 Id. Normally, hearsay evidence is permitted in an extradition proceeding to establish probable cause. Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1901). The Federal Rules of
Evidence do not apply to extradition proceedings. Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3); Messina v.
United States, 728 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1984) (evidentiary rules of criminal litigation not
applicable to extradition proceedings). An extradition practitioner has expressed the view
that "if courts feel sufficiently uncomfortable about the fairness of the fate awaiting the
accused, they may be more lenient in granting him scope to put on a defense here, or may
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The court was similarly cautious in Ex parte La Mantia,2 9 where
the extraditee had also been convicted of murder in absentia.3 0 The
court denied extradition because the extraditee had not been adequately identified, stating at the same time that a conviction in absen3
tia would not be a bar to extradition. '
In United States ex rel. Argento v. Jacobs,3 2 the extraditee had been
convicted in absentia in Italy in 1931 for a murder that occurred in
1922. Extradition was sought in 1959. The district court expressed
serious concern over the fact that the extraditee had been convicted
in absentia:
If the order of the United States Commissioner is upheld, petitioner will be surrendered to the Italian authorities and his life sentence put into effect. He will not be given an opportunity to defend
himself on the charge of murder.
While this procedure of trial of a defendant, in absentia, on a
criminal charge, particularly one as serious as murder, does not
comport with our ideas ofjustice or fairness, it must be remembered
that petitioner is an Italian National and alleged to be a fugitive from
the country. The offense was committed in Italy and is governed by
Italian law which permits the trial of a criminal case in absentia.
Petitioner's conviction, however, having been rendered in absentia, this Court must inquire into the evidence of criminality, as
extradition 33is not warranted simply by a showing of the in absentia
conviction.

The district court then examined the witness statements and found a
lack of probable cause. 34 The court reasoned that in extradition
cases involving in absentia convictions the court "must scrutinize the
evidence carefully to determine at least a reasonable probability that
the petitioner was guilty of the crime." 3 5 While that is the normal
probable cause standard, the court's language suggests that the fact
of the in absentia conviction colored its review of the evidence, making it more skeptical than it otherwise would have been.
In In re Mylonas, 3 6 a Greek national who had taken up residence
in Alabama was sought by Greece after having been convicted in absentia of embezzlement. The district court judge who conducted the
extradition hearing decided that the extradition request had to fail
because of Greece's delay in making its request, which came three
become exceptionally demanding of technical perfection in the extradition request."
Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1446-47 (1988).
29 206 F. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
30 In fact there was some confusion as to whether he had been tried in absentia or
had simply been bound over for trial. The court said that, for purposes of its decision on
extradition, it did not matter which was the case. Id. at 331.
31 Id. at 330.
32 176 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
33 d. at 879.
34 Id. at 879-83.
35 Id. at 883.
36 187 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ala. 1960).
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years after the in absentia trial.3 7 The extraditee had been a member
of the town council of a Greek town, and the charges alleged that in
that capacity he had embezzled town funds. The judge scrutinized
the proceedings carefully, leading him to conclude that the charges
were pretextual.3 8 He delved deeply into the Greek trial proceedings, finding "contradictions, variations and changes of position" in
the testimony of several witnesses.3 9
The judge concluded that the charges had been filed at the instance of an opposition political group that had come to power, and
that the charges were political in character. On that basis he found
Mylonas non-extraditable under the extradition treaty. 40 The judge
cited no authority for his conclusion that the charge was a political
offense, and it is unlikely he could have found any. The prevailing
doctrine on political offenses required that the act be done as part of
a struggle for political power. 4 1 This was clearly not the case in the
extraditee's alleged offense. The judge expanded the political offense exception to avoid extraditing a person he thought was being
treated unfairly by the courts of the requesting state. While giving
lip service to the doctrine that in absentia convictions do not preclude extradition, 4 2 he was not following the non-inquiry approach.
In addition to the circumvention of the rule of non-inquiry
through a hard look at probable cause or through liberal interpretation of exceptions to the rule, an apparent deviation from the rule
has occurred in some in absentia conviction cases. In these cases the
court appears to have been influenced in favor of extradition by assurances that the extraditee would have a new trial upon return to
Italy. In In re Macaluso,43 for example, the Italian consul testified
before the magistrate that the extraditee, convicted in absentia of a
kidnap-murder, could be given a new trial under Italian procedure. 4 4
The magistrate ordered extradition after finding Italy's proof of guilt
to meet the probable cause standard, and the Secretary of State surrendered the extraditee to Italian authorities. 4 5 Similarly, in In re
D'Amico 46 the court entered a finding of extraditability after it was
represented to the court on behalf of Italy that the extraditee, convicted in absentia of kidnapping and robbery, would be retried after
37 Id. at 721.
38 Id.

39 Id. at 720.
Id. at 721.
41 In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
42 187 F. Supp. at 721.
43 Hyde, A Report of a Recent Extradition Case: Re Macaluso, 7 ILL. L. REv. 237 (1912)
40

(unreported case) (written by counsel for the Italian government in the case).
44 Id. at 238.
45 Id. at 242.
46 177 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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Other courts have ordered extradition, however, despite Italy's
failure to provide for retrial. In Gallina v. Fraser,48 the district court
ordered extradition of a man convicted in absentia twice in Italy of
armed robbery, even though, it said, Italy evidently did not plan a
new trial. 4 9 The court of appeals affirmed.50 It alluded to the fact
that in some similar cases the Department of State had demanded
that Italy retry the extraditee after surrender, 5 ' but said that whether
or not Italy conducted a retrial was not relevant to the court's determination of extraditability. 52 Having said that, the court went on,
however, to say that, in one of the extraditee's in absentia convictions, a lawyer had represented him at the trial, and, in the other
case, alleged confederates were before the court during the proceedings. 53 The court thus implied that had the extraditee not been represented, and had no confederates been present, it might have
reexamined the rule of non-inquiry. After reciting cases in which
courts did not consider the type of proceedings awaiting the extraditee, the court of appeals discussed its reservations about the
rule of non-inquiry, stating that it could imagine situations where the
extraditee, upon extradition, "would be subject to procedures or
punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to
54
require reexamination of [the rule of non-inquiry]."
While the courts have not expressly refused to extradite because
of an in absentia conviction, they have expressed concern over the
matter. For example, in United States ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler,55 two
extraditees were sought by Canada, where they had been tried on
charges of importation of hashish. The extraditees were present at
the Canadian trial and represented by counsel. 56 After the close of
evidence, the trial judge dismissed the charges for a variance between the indictment and the proof presented at trial. 5 7 An appeals
court disagreed with the trial judge and, as it was permitted to do
under Canadian procedure, itself entered a judgment of
47 Id. at 651 n.3.

48 177 F. Supp. 856 (D. Conn. 1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
851 (1960).
49 Id. at 866.
50 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960).
5' Id. at 78.
52 Id.

53 Id. at 79.
54 d. Italian procedure again passed muster in the federal courts in Esposito v. Adams,
700 F. Supp. 1470 (N.D. Ill. 1988). In that case the court ordered extradition even after
concluding that Italian procedures "were far from lacking even the barest rudiments of a

process calculated to arrive at the truth of the accusations." Id. at 1481.
55 507 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974).
56 Id. at 926.
57 Id.
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conviction. 58
The extraditees argued that because they were not present at
the appellate proceedings, they had been convicted in absentia. 59
Because the extraditees had been present at the trial, the court of
appeals said they had not been tried in absentia. 6° The court acknowledged, however, that in an appropriate case inability to assert a
defense might be so repugnant to its sense of decency as to bar extradition. 6' Other courts have nevertheless taken the position that
the United States considered the trial procedures in the requesting
state before concluding an extradition treaty with it, and that extradition would be undermined by a rule that required that the requesting
state conduct a trial in the manner in which it would be conducted in
the United States because most extradition partners of the United
States have procedural systems that differ from that of the United
62
States.
The Secretary of State has on occasion required Italy to agree to
retry a person tried in absentia. 63 Federal courts that have declined
to consider possible unfairness in the anticipated proceedings in the
requesting state have said that it is the Secretary of State who is to
consider this issue when he decides whether to surrender the extraditee.6 4 Nevertheless, some courts appear to have been influenced by the requesting state's plan to provide a new trial for the
extraditee. 65 Those courts that have relied on the Secretary of State
to consider the issue may have misplaced their reliance because the
Secretary of State has only rarely refused to surrender a person
66
found extraditable by a magistrate.
In addition to the problem of in absentia convictions, courts frequently have addressed concerns of extraditees regarding lack of
protection from enemies in the requesting state, political persecution, cruelty in interrogation and punishment, and various unfair
trial procedures. In Nicosia v. Wall, 6 7 an extraditee was sought by
Panama on a charge of having, in his capacity as Minister of the Pre58 Id.

59 Id. at 928.
60 Id. at 928-29.
61 Id. at 928.
62 See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
63 Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aft'd, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d
Cir. 1990) (citing Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 78 (2d Cir. 1960)).
64 In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d
776 (9th Cir. 1986).
65 See, e.g., supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.

66 Kester, supra note 28, at 1485-86. In 1985 the European Court of Human Rights
held that the Italian in absentia trial system violated the right to a fair trial, as guaranteed
by the (European) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, art. 6(1) [hereinafter European Convention]. In re
Colozza, 89 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1985).
67 442 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1971).
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sidencia in the government of Panama, obtained improper mortgage
financing from the Social Security Bank of Panama. 6 8 The court of
appeals suspected that the government of Panama had a political
vendetta against the extraditee. 69 It cited certain notes referring to
the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
that the Department of State had recently sent to Panama in similar
situations. 70 Having become a party to the Protocol, the United
States had agreed not to return any refugee who had a well-founded
fear of political persecution in the state seeking extradition. 7 ' The
court of appeals consequently remanded to the district court for a
determination of whether the extraditee might be persecuted for his
political opinions if surrendered. 72 The court thus recognized that a
requirement of human rights law relating to political refugees must
be taken into account by a federal court in assessing a request for
extradition.
In Peroff v. Hylton, 73 an extraditee sought by Sweden on securities fraud charges had been investigated by the United States Depart-.
ment of Justice on narcotics importation charges and had been given
74
the benefit of a witness protection agreement in that connection.
He argued that there were "potential assassins" in Swedish prisons,
and that his surrender would therefore jeopardize his life. 75 The
court said that a "denial of extradition by the Executive may be appropriate when strong humanitarian grounds are present, but such
grounds exist only when it appears that, if extradited, the individual
will be persecuted, not prosecuted, or subjected to grave injustice. '' 76 The court concluded that there was no reason to believe that
77
Sweden could not protect the extraditee in prison.
In Sindona v. Grant,78 an extraditee sought by Italy on charges of
having participated in a fraudulent bankruptcy said that he had political enemies in Italy and presented a photograph from a street demonstration in which a participant displayed a slogan reading "Death
to Sindona." 79 The court said that "the degree of risk to Sindona's
68 Id. at 1006.
69 Id.

70 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 78
(1967).
71 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
(incorporated by reference in the 1967 Protocol).
72 442 F.2d at 1006-07.
73 542 F.2d 1247 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
74 Id. at 1248.
75 Id. at 1249.
76 Id.
77 Id. Similarly, in In re Geisser the extraditee was found extraditable despite her fear

that she might be killed in a Swiss prison by those against whom she had given information. 627 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
78 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1980).
79 Id. at 174.
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life from extradition is an issue that properly falls within the exclusive purview of the executive branch." 8 0° Also, the district judge who
issued the extradition order said that questions of possible unfairness in the anticipated proceedings were for the Secretary of State,
but he did assess allegations that Sindona made about the quality of
criminal justice in Italy. 8 ' The judge. concluded that
Sindona has not made even a threshold showing that he would be
subjected to procedures. in Italy which would be so violative of
human rights as to prevent extradition. There is no indication in the
material submitted by Sindona that the Republic ofItaly subjects
accused persons to anything approaching summary proceedings or
'kangaroo courts,' which occur in nations which disregard human
rights. Italy has a criminal justice
system which comports with stan82
dards of the civilized world.
The district judge acknowledged that Italy was experiencing "difficulties in the administration of its court system and its prisons," but

he cited a letter from the Department of State indicating that United
States military personnel who had been tried in Italian courts "have
not been subjected to inhumane or degrading punishment in Italy." 8 3 Thus, despite the fact that the judge concluded that he need
not take evidence regarding the Italian system ofjustice, by considering such evidence he implied that if the allegations were serious
84
enough they might be a bar to a finding of extraditability.
In Armbjornsdottir-Mendlerv. United States,8 5 an extraditee sought
by Iceland on narcotics importation charges complained that if surrendered to Iceland she would be held in solitary confinement during interrogation.8 6 She argued that this would involve treatment
"antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency," 8 7 and that she
therefore should not be surrendered. 8 8 The court of appeals said
that it was not necessary to inquire into the extraditee's allegation
because her allegations were uncorroborated and to be considered
"[i]n light of Iceland's outstanding human rights record." 8 9
In Prushinowski v. Samples, 90 a Hassidic Jew being extradited on
theft charges to the United Kingdom argued that, if he were imprisoned in the United Kingdom, then his dietary needs could not be
met, he would be unable to eat, and he would starve. 9' The court of
80 Id.
81 In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 694 (S.D.N.Y.
82 Id. at 695.

1978).

83 Id.
84 Id.
85 721 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1983).
86 Id. at 683.
87 Id. (quoting Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960)).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 734 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1984).

91 Id. at 1018.
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appeals suggested that the United Kingdom could cope with the extraditee's dietary needs and said that the extraditee's problem would
be of his own making and ordered extradition. 92 While maintaining
that "constitutional questions of deprivation of rights are addressed
only to the acts of the United States Government and not to those of
a foreign nation, at least for purposes of determining questions of
extraditability," 9 3 the court nonetheless said:
Seldom, however, can a principle of law be carried to absolute extremes without developing fissures. It is unlikely that extradition
would be ordered if the facts were established ...that the prisons of
a foreign country regularly opened each day's proceedings with a
hundred lashes applied to the back of each prisoner who did not
deny his or her God
or conducted routine breakings on the wheel
94
for every prisoner.
It was unclear whether the court meant that extradition in such a
case would be denied by a court or by the Secretary of State.
In In re Burr,95 a case in which West Germany sought surrender
on a murder charge, the extraditee argued that the sixteen years that
had elapsed since the alleged offense would make it difficult for him
to be given a fair trial in West Germany. 96 The court of appeals replied by providing reasons why that delay had occurred and by holding that extradition was proper so long as there was no violation of

"exceptional constitutional limitations as may exist because of particularly atrocious procedures or punishments employed -by the foreign
jurisdiction. ' 9 7 In this case the court found no such violation. 98
In Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 99 the extraditee was sought by Israel on
World War II murder and war crimes charges. The court of appeals

discussed the question of whether Israel had jurisdiction over these
charges and concluded that it did. Citing Gallina, the court said that
it would not inquire into potential irregularities in the anticipated
Israeli proceedings "[fi]n the absence of any showing that Demjanjuk
will be subjected to 'procedures antipathetic to a federal court's
sense of decency.' "100 The court's language suggests that in an appropriate situation it would inquire into the quality of the proceedings awaiting the extraditee.
In Linnas v. INS,' 0 1 the United States was deporting, rather than
extraditing, a man to the Soviet Union, but was doing so with the
understanding that the Soviet Union would try the man on World
Id. at 1019.
Id. at 1018.
Id. at 1019.
737 F.2d 1477 (7th Cir. 1984).
96 Id. at 1486-87.
97 Id. at 1487.
92
93
94
95

98 Id. at 1487.

99 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1985).

100 Id. at 583 (quoting Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960)).
10I 790 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986).
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War II war crimes charges. He argued that he would be denied certain procedural safeguards at his anticipated trial in the Soviet
Union, although he was not specific as to what unlawful treatment he
expected. 10 2 The court of appeals, citing Gallina, found no evidence
of potential treatment in the U.S.S.R. "antipathetic to a federal
03
court's sense of decency."'
In Ahmad v. Wigen, 10 4 the extraditee was a West Bank Arab and a
naturalized United States citizen sought by Israel for murder. He
was alleged to be a member of a terrorist group called the Abu Nidal
Organization.' 0 5 The charges alleged that as a member of that organization he carried out an armed attack on a passenger bus, killing
its driver. These events allegedly occurred in the West Bank territory under the military occupation of Israel.' 0 6 The extraditee
argued that, if surrendered, he would be tortured during interrogation, he would be convicted on his own or his alleged confederates'
coerced confessions, and he would be incarcerated in indecent facilities. He argued that extradition under these circumstances would
violate due process of law under the United States Constitution0 7and
would violate internationally recognized human rights norms.'
The district court heard evidence that it was the practice of
Israel's security police to use force in the interrogation of Arabs arrested in the West Bank on security-related charges.' 0 8 The court
quoted from a human rights report on Israel by the Department of
State that said: "Reports of beatings of suspects and detainees continue, as do reports of harsh and demeaning treatment of prisoners
and detainees."' 0 9 The court also alluded to a 1987 report commissioned by the government of Israel on the use of force by the security
police during interrogations."1 0 This report said that force was routinely used, both to extract a confession for use at trial and to gain
information about the organizations of which the suspect was a member."' The Israeli report, known as the Landau Report, said that
when psychological methods are insufficient to get a statement, "a
102 Id. at 1032.

103 Id. at 1032 (quoting Gallina, 278 F.2d at 79).
104 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aft'd, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
105 Id. at 417.
106 Id. at 394.
107 Id. at 409.
108 Id. at 416.
109 Id.; DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1988,
101ST CONG., IST SESS. 1378 (1989).
I 10 Id. (citing Report of the [Israeli] Commission of Inquiry into Methods of Interrogationof the
General Security Service in Regard to Hostile TerroristActivity of 1987 (popularly known as "Landau Report" after its chair, Moshe Landau, former ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court of
Israel)).
III Landau Report, supra note 110, at 2.18. See generally Quigley, InternationalLimits on
Use of Force to Elicit Confessions: A Critiqueof Israel'sPolicy on Interrogation, 14 BROOKLYNJ. INT'L

L. 485 (1988).
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moderate measure of physical pressure is not to be avoided.""i 2
This amounted to a directive to investigators to use force against suspects. The government of Israel approved the report, thereby making the directive its own." 18 The Landau Report also said that in
security-related cases a confession was virtually always the primary
evidence against the accused, 1 4 and that interrogators, if required
to testify as to how they gained the confession, often falsely denied
5
that they had used force."
The extraditee in Ahmad v. Wigen argued that the policy of
Israel's government called for the use of force against him during
interrogation because he was a West Bank Arab charged with a security-related offense and because he was alleged to be a member of
an anti-Israel terrorist organization. 1 6 In an affidavit submitted to
the court describing the procedures that would be used after surrender, the Ministry of Justice of Israel implicitly acknowledged that the
7
extraditee would be interrogated." 1
The district court, acknowledging Israel's policy in favor of the
use of force in interrogations, held that it could not find that this
policy would be applied to the extraditee."18 The court reasoned,
first, that two other persons recently extradited from the United
States to Israel, John Demjanjuk and Ziad Abu Eain, had not been
physically abused. 1 9 John Demjanjuk, 120 however, did not meet the
criteria indicated by the government of Israel for use of force because it was unlikely that he had any information about terrorist activities.' 2 1 Ziad Abu Eain was an Arab sought on security-related
23
charges,' 22 and he had, in fact, alleged physical abuse.'
Second, the district court reasoned that because the extraditee
had been away from the Middle East for two years, any knowledge he
might have about terrorist activities or the Abu Nidal organization
would be "stale."' 12 4 This fact was significant to the court because
"[a]s the Landau [R]eport states, 'top priority' of interrogation is to
112 Landau Report, supra note 110, at 4.7. See also Occhiogrosso, The Shin Beth Affair:
National Security Versus the Rule of Law in the State of Israel, 11 Loy. L.A. Iwr'L & COMP. LJ. 67,
111 (1989).
113 CabinetAdopts Inquiry Finding: Shin Beth Perjury Report Draws Mixed Reaction,Jerusalem
Post (int'l ed.), Nov. 14, 1987, at 1, col. 4.
114 Landau Report, supra note 110, at 2.19.
1'5 Id. at 2.24.

116 726 F. Supp. at 409.
'17 Id. at 422 (Affidavit of Dorit Beinish, State Attorney, Ministry ofJustice) (referring
to "his interrogation" as an event that will occur after surrender).
118 Id. at 417.
'19 Id.

120
(1986).
121
122
123

Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016
Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 417.
Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 507 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 417.

124 Id.
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gather information 'for the purpose of preventing and foiling [terrorist acts].... Obtaining evidence to bring a suspect to trial is not
the top priority of ...investigative work.' ",125 Based on this prioritizing by the Israelis, the court held that the extraditee "[did] not fit
the profile of the ordinary security suspect against whom the secret
police might have reason to exert pressure. "126
The court's analysis involved a misreading of the Landau Report. While the report did say that the interrogators' highest priority
was general information about the hostile organizations, as opposed
to information to use against the suspect at trial, it did not say that
interrogators refrained from using force when the only information
to be obtained from a particular suspect was information for use at
that suspect's trial. On the contrary, the report made clear that the
12 7
policy was to use force to obtain confessions for use at trial.
Finally, the district court was influenced by the Israeli government's promise not to mistreat Ahmad after his extradition. 2 8 It
cited the affidavit of the Ministry of Justice of Israel, which stated,
"we offer our assurance that if Atta12 9 is extradited to Israel, his interrogation will not employ torture, physical or psychological, or inhumane treatment or improper means, as described in the testimony
before the Court."' 3 0
Although the court thus found that abuse was not likely, it said
that potential mistreatment in the requesting state was relevant on
an extradition decision.'13 It said that a judge in an extradition proceeding should "determine the nature of treatment probably awaiting petitioner in a requesting nation to determine whether he or she
can demonstrate probable exposure to such treatment as would violate universally accepted principles of human rights."' 13 2 "We cannot blind ourselves," said the court, "to the foreseeable and
probable results of the exercise of our jurisdiction."' 1 33 The district
court called this requirement a "due process exception to the rule of
13 4
non-inquiry."'
The court defined "[tiorture and cruel and unusual punishment" to include "threats and other inhumane psychological harms
including trickery designed to cause despair, [which could be] even
125 Id. (citing the Landau Report, supra note 110, at 2.17).

126 Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 417.
127 Landau Report, supra note 110, at 2.18, 2.22.
128 Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 417.
129 The extraditee, Ahmad, had also been referred to in the district court proceedings
as "Atta."
130 Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 422 (Affidavit of Dorit Beinish, State Attorney, Ministry of
Justice).
131 Id. at410.
132 Id.
133 Id.
'34

Id.
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more painful and more effective than physical pressure."'' 3 The
court did not require that the anticipated torture or cruel treatment
be condoned by the government of the requesting state. Accordingly, the court found that "[e]ven if the probably inhumane act is
unauthorized by the requesting nation and is applied by those abusing power, it could constitute a basis for non-extradition."' 3 6 The
district court cited a 1983 opinion of the European Commission of
Human Rights, in which an extraditee had argued that he would be
tortured in Turkey, the requesting state,
even though the Turkish
3 7

government had tried to stop torture.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of extraditability, but admonished the district court for taking evidence on
how Israeli authorities were likely to treat Ahmad after extradition.
According to the court of appeals, "the interests of international
comity are ill-served by requiring a foreign nation such as Israel to
satisfy a United States district judge concerning the fairness of its
laws and the manner in which they are enforced."'13 8 The court said
that it was the practice of the Secretary of State to refuse extradition
if the extraditee would be treated improperly.13 9
Despite the admonition of the court of appeals in Ahmad v.
Wigen, the federal case law on extradition does reflect judicial concern about the potential treatment of an extraditee by the requesting
state. The cases have not been uniform in their approach to an extraditee's plea of anticipated ill treatment. Some have held that it is
not relevant, while others have examined the allegations and concluded that they were not well established before entering a finding
of extraditability. These courts thus have implied that they would
refuseto order extradition if they were convinced that serious unlawful treatment would be visited upon the extraditee. To date, however, no federal court has applied this reasoning to bar a requested
extradition.

II. The Relevance of Human Rights Law
The district court's allusion in Ahmad v. Wigen to human rights
law introduced an element not mentioned in earlier cases. Extradition law came into being long before the emergence of human rights
law. Considerations of the rights of the extraditee were not, for the
most part, deemed to play a role.
In the mid-twentieth century, however, the law of human rights
emerged as a body of law binding on states. That body of law is held
135 Id. at 415.
136 Id.

137 Id. (citing Altun v. Federal Republic of Germany, 36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 209, 23335 (1983)).
138 Ahmad, 910 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1990).
139 Id.
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by courts of the United States to be binding on them, even apart
140
from any treaty obligation that the United States has assumed.
Human rights law is relevant to extradition law in that among the
human rights norms binding on states are prohibitions against prolonged arbitrary detention' 4' and against torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.' 42 International
human rights law requires states to provide fair trials with a presumption of innocence and the rights to present a defense and to be
represented by counsel.' 45 It also gives rights to the individual re44
garding speech, assembly,, conscience, equality, and privacy.'
In applying human rights law to extradition law, one issue to be
addressed is whether, if a requesting state violates these rights with
respect to an extraditee, the violation is imputed to the requested
state. Additionally, one must consider whether the court should use
international human rights standards to assess the treatment awaiting the extraditee. Finally, the question arises whether the court is
under an obligation to assess the anticipated treatment of the extraditee, or whether it may consider that it is not responsible for potential violations of human rights by the requesting state.
In general, a court need concern itself only with the propriety of
its own actions or of the actions of administrative officials under its
jurisdiction (e.g., police officers and judges of lower courts). The
United States Supreme Court has held, however, that there may be
instances in which a court is responsible for the fact that by its decision it may facilitate an unlawful act by a party for whose actions it is
not otherwise responsible. In Shelley v. Kraemer,14 5 the Court said
that a court that enforces a racially discriminatory contract does, by
the act of giving enforcement, facilitate the discrimination, because
46
without the enforcement the contract would have no meaning.'
Two United States servicemen contesting their surrender to
West Germany by the United States Army under the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization's agreement on status of forces 14 7 made such an
argument in Holmes v. Laird.148 West Germany sought them for trial
140 Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF

702 (1987).
141 Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 791-92 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on other
grounds sub. nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 9, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
175; RESTATEMENT, supra note 140, § 702(e).
142 RESTATEMENT, supra note 140, § 702(d); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 141, art. 7.
143 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 141, art. 14.
144 Id., arts. 17-19, 21-22.
145 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

146 Id. at 13.

147 North Atlantic Treaty, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199
U.N.T.S. 67 (regarding the. status of forces).
148 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972).
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on charges of attempted rape. 14 9 The two had already been convicted in a West German court but were in the custody of the United
States Army. They brought suit against the Secretary of Defense in a
federal district court, arguing that they should not be surrendered
because they had been denied a speedy trial (the trial having taken
place six months after the charge); they had been denied their request to be represented by a United States civilian attorney and were
unable to communicate because of the language barrier with the
German attorney who represented them; they had been denied the
right to confront the prosecution because they were excluded from
the courtroom while the victim testified; and they had been denied a
fair appeal because no verbatim transcript was made of the trial
0
proceedings. 15

The two servicemen argued that if the United States Army surrendered them, this would constitute "governmental involvement"
in the allegedly unfair trial procedures. 15 1 The court of appeals,
however, citing Neely v. Henkel, 152 held that there was no right to be
tried under United States procedures where trial was to be conducted in another country and that the surrender by United States
authorities did not violate the rights of the two servicemen. 153 Because it found that the treatment they would receive was fair, the
court of appeals did not address the petitioners' argument that a surrender where unfair procedures were anticipated would mean that
United States courts were acting unlawfully.
In Ahmad v. Wigen, the district court acknowledged that if a
United States court turns an extraditee over to a state that will commit rights violations, then the United States court itself is involved in
those violations.' 5 4 In that case the court considered a hypothetical
situation in which an individual was involved in a civil war of liberation against a dictatorial government and was sought by that government to be surrendered from the United States. 15 5 The court said
that "[t]o enforce extradition orders under such circumstances may
implicate our courts in grave injustices and cruel repressions." 156 As
for potential mistreatment of an extraditee, it said that a court must
consider "the foreseeable and probable results of the exercise of our
57

jurisdiction."'

1

The Almad district court stated that a judge "has the power and
responsibility to ensure that the judicial function is not abused in any
149 Id. at 1214.
150

Id.

151 Id. at 1217.
152 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
153 459 F.2d at 1218-19.
154 See supra text accompanying notes 131-134.
55r Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 405 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)).
156 Id.
157 Id.
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way [and] that anybody extradited will be treated fairly in the state to
which he or she is being extradited. That applies both to trial and to
treatment before trial, incarceration and to punishment, if any." 1 58
Thus, if a court extradites to a state where torture will be administered, the judicial function is abused.
The district court's approach in Almad is consistent with the obligations of a state with respect to human rights. Human rights law
requires states to treat persons in given ways, but a state is not liable
for every human rights violation committed by every other state.
The American Convention on Human Rights requires states parties
to ensure human rights "to all persons subject to their jurisdiction." 159 The European human rights convention 160 requires states
parties to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction" the rights it
defines. 161
These formulations could be read as inapplicable to a requested
state, since it is not the state that inflicts the unlawful treatment. On
the other hand, the extraditee is "within" the jurisdiction of the requested state (the European formulation), or "subject" to its jurisdiction (the American formulation). Therefore, it could be argued
that the court must ensure the extraditee's rights, regardless of who
162
might actually inflict the unlawful treatment.
This issue was considered by the European Court of Human
Rights in Soering v. United Kingdom, 163 a case cited extensively by the

district court in Ahmad v. Wigen. 16 4 The United States requested extradition from the United Kingdom of a German national sought by
Virginia on a capital murder charge. 16 5 After the United Kingdom
decided to surrender him, the extraditee complained to the European Commission on Human Rights, which administers the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 166 to which the United Kingdom is a party.
The extraditee argued that surrender would violate his rights since,
if convicted of capital murder in Virginia, he would be sentenced to
death and confined on death row there. 167 He argued that the length
158 Id. at 399.

159 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 1, OEA/ser.
K/XVI/I.1, doc. 65 rev. 1, corr. 1 (Jan. 7, 1970), reprinted in9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
160 European Convention, supra note 66.
161 Id., art. 1.

162 Neither the European nor the American convention is directly applicable to a
United States court. The European convention binds those European states that have ratified it. The United States has signed the American Convention but has not ratified it. The
two conventions are cited here rather as an indication of the approach taken in international human rights law generally.
163 195 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), reprintedin 28 I.L.M. 1069, 1088 (1989).
164 Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 413-15.
165 Soering, 195 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at $ 105.
166 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5.
167 As related in Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 413.
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and conditions of incarceration on death row constituted cruel treatment under the European Convention.'6 The United Kingdom responded that it was not responsible for whatever treatment Soering
might be given in the United States.
The Commission referred the case to the European Court of
Human Rights, the highest decision-making body under the European Convention. 69 The court decided that incarceration on Virginia's death row would constitute cruel treatment and ruled the
United Kingdom would be in violation of the convention if it surrendered Soering for a trial on capital murder charges there.170 Referring to the Convention's "special character as a treaty for the
collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms,"
the court said that "the object and purpose of the Convention as an
instrument for the protection of individual human beings require
that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective."171
The court stated that Article 1 of the European Convention
"cannot be read as justifying a general principle to the effect that,
notwithstanding its extradition obligations, a Contracting State may
not surrender an individual unless satisfied that the conditions awaiting him in the country of destination are in full accord with each of
the safeguards of the Convention."'' 7 2 The court found, however,
that these considerations cannot "absolve the Contracting Parties
from responsibility under Article 3 for all and any foreseeable consequences of extradition suffered outside their jurisdiction."'17 3 The
district court in Ahmad found the Soering decision to be "an important
precedent on the refusal to extradite because of anticipated torture,
cruel conditions of incarceration or lack of due process at trial in the
requesting country,"' 74 reflecting the "present status of interna75
tional and human rights law on. this issue."'1
The European Commission on Human Rights has on a number
of occasions said that extradition would be unlawful if the extraditee
could be expected to be tortured or otherwise physically mistreated
by the requesting state. The Commission has repeatedly held that
either expulsion or extradition is unlawful if the deportee or extraditee can be expected to be treated in ways that violate Article 3 of
168 Id.
169 European Convention, supra note 66, arts. 52-53.
170 Soering, 195 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 111. See also Quigley & Shank, Death Row as a
Violation of Human Rights: Is It Illegal to Extradite to Virginia?, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 241 (1990).
171 Soering, 195 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 87.
172 Id. at
86.

173 Id.
174 Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 414.
175 Id. at 413.
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the European Convention. 1 76 In X v. FederalRepublic of Germany, the
Commission said that extradition would be unlawful if there was a
risk of torture in the requesting state.' 77 In X v. Austria & Yugoslavia,
the Commission said that extradition might raise an issue under the
Convention's article prohibiting torture or cruel treatment if it appeared that the rights of the extraditee would be violated in the requesting state.1 78 Throughout its decisions, the European
79
Commission has repeatedly reaffirmed this position.1
In the context of rights of individuals in wartime, states are
deemed responsible for rights violations by other states. The four
Geneva conventions of 1949 on the conduct of warfare, many of
whose provisions are aimed at protecting the rights of individuals in
wartime, all require the states parties to "ensure respect" for individual rights by other states parties.18 0 This provision was based on a
concept that the rights of individuals in wartime could be protected
effectively only if states encouraged other states to comply. The four
Geneva conventions thus operate on the premise that a state has obligations not only itself to protect the rights of the individual, but
also to ensure that other states do the same.
An international treaty on the prevention of torture prohibits
extraditing a person to a state where he would be tortured. The
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or Punishment states that no party
"shall expel, return [refouler] or extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
176 j. FAWCETT, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

38-40 (1969); P. SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 168 (1983).

177 X v. Federal Republic of Germany, 6 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 462, 480 (Eur.
Comm'n on Hum. Rts. 1963).
178 X v. Austria & Yugoslavia, 7 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 314, 328 (Eur.
Comm'n on Hum. Rts. 1964).
179 See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, No. 14038/88, 94 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum.
Rts. 1989) (report in which the Commission recalled its "case-law that a person's deportation or extradition may give rise to an issue under Article 3 of the convention where there
are serious reasons to believe that the individual will be subjected, in the receiving State,
to treatment contrary to that Article"); Altun v. Federal Republic of Germany, 36 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. 209 (1983) (extradition precluded in face of the risk that the charges filed in
the requesting state were false and that, since the individual was suspected of interfering
with criminal proceedings against the murderers of a political figure, torture might be
used to extract information from him); X v. Switzerland, 34 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 205 (1981)
(extradition might raise issue under art. 3 if rights of extraditee would be violated in requesting state); Amekrane v. United Kingdom, 16 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTs. 356 (Eur.
Comm'n on Hum. Rts. 1973) (extradition precluded if torture or other ill treatment is
anticipated).
180 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (art. I of each convention).
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danger of being subjected to torture."' 8 ' The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture states that "[e]xtradition shall
not be granted nor shall the person sought be returned when there
are grounds to believe that his life is in danger, that he will be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or
that he will be tried by special or ad hoc courts in the requesting
182
state."'
Courts in Germany and France have taken the same position.
The government of Germany, appearing before the European Court
of Human Rights in Soering, said that the German courts hold that
extradition should be denied where inhuman or degrading treatment
is anticipated in the requesting state.' 8 3 Similarly, French courts
have declined to extradite where there was an indication of violations
of human rights standards by the requesting state. The standard
these courts have developed is to deny extradition if the requesting
state would treat the extraditee in a manner that violates French conceptions of public order.
In In re Croissant,'8 4 a German national fought extradition requested by West Germany, taking his case to the Conseil d'Etat,
France's highest administrative tribunal, which has the power to
quash a government decision to extradite. Croissant pointed out
that after his alleged offense the German penal statute that he had
allegedly violated had been amended to include a monetary fine as a
possible penalty, in addition to the term of imprisonment provided
by the statute in its original form.' 8 5 He contended that this constituted ex post facto legislation and that his extradition would therefore violate French public order, which does not recognize ex post
facto legislation.' 8 6 The Conseil said that this change in the German
statute was to the benefit of the defendant and therefore did not con87
stitute ex post facto legislation.'
181 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 3, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51, entered into force June 26, 1987, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24
I.L.M. 535 (1985). The United States has not signed or ratified this convention.
182 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Mar. 12, 1986, art. 13,
O.A.S. T.S. No. 67, OEA/ser. P/AG, doc. 2023/85 rev. 1,at 46-54, reprinted in 25 I.L.M.
519 (1986).
183 Soering v. United Kingdom, 195 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 82 (1989), reprinted in
28 I.L.M. 1069, 1088 (1989).
184 In re Croissant, Judgment of July 7, 1978, Conseil d'Etat, 106 JOURNAL DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 90, 93 (1979).
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. This case was cited by France's government attorney as standing for the propo-

sition that the Conseil d'Etat refuses extradition where the extraditee would be treated in a
manner that would violate French public order. In re Fidan, Judgment of Feb. 27, 1987,
Conseil d'Etat, 1987 D.S. Jur. 305, 306 (conclusions of Mr. Bonichot, government
attorney).
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In In re Lujambio-Galdeano,18 8 the Conseil d'Etat stated the broad
proposition that it would not extradite to a requesting state whose
judicial system did not respect basic rights. Spain sought the extradition of several Basque separatists on murder charges, and the French
government ordered extradition. The Basque extraditees argued
before the Conseil that the procedures followed by Spain's courts to
try Basque separatists on charges related to separatism were in violation of basic due process norms. They said that they would be tortured, that they would be tried in a special court established in
Madrid to handle such cases, and that a 1980 Spanish statute had
authorized domicile searches without articulable suspicion, wiretaps,
and mail openings in the cases of persons deemed terrorists.' 8 9 The
Conseil, apparently on the basis of its finding that Spanish law forbade torture, that the special court in Madrid had jurisdiction not
only over terrorism but over other serious crimes as well, and that
the limitations on rights were justifiable, decided that LujambioGaldeano's rights would not be violated after surrender. The Conseil refused to bar the extradition, because, it said, "contrary to the
allegations of the claimant, the Spanish judicial system respects the
fundamental rights and liberties of the individual, as is required by
the general principles of the law of extradition."' 190 The Conseil
thus recognized that observance by the requesting state of the basic
rights of the extraditee is a prerequisite for extradition.
In the case of Memik Fidan, 19 1 the Conseil d'Etat applied this
principle to block an extradition on the grounds that the extraditee
would be treated in violation of French public order. In that case,
Turkey sought extradition on a charge of murder of a Turkish national residing in France. The French government asked the Turkish
government whether the death penalty would be imposed, as its imposition would violate French public order. The Turkish government replied that the death penalty did not apply to the charge as
made against Fidan, because the death penalty only applied to the
92
charge of premeditated murder, a charge not made against Fidan.1
France then decided to extradite, stipulating to the Turkish government that it was doing so on the understanding that the death penalty would not be applied.' 9 3 The Conseil d'Etat nonetheless held
the extradition order invalid, finding that imposition of the death
penalty violates French public order, and that France did not have
188 1985 J.C.P. II No. 20346.
189 Assertions of extraditees described in conclusions of Mr. Genevois, Commissaire
du Gouvernement, id.
190 Id.
191 In re Fidan, Judgment of Feb. 27, 1987, Conseil d'Etat, 1987 D.S. Jur. 305.
192 Id. at 306.
193 Id.
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the agreement of Turkey not to impose the death penalty. 9 4
.i Some French courts of appeal have said that extradition
is precluded if the extraditee was convicted in absentia in the requesting
state.' 9 5 Additionally, according to France's attorney general,
French courts of appeal refuse extradition if an extraditee would, in
presenting a defense, be denied any of the rights deemed rules of
96
France's ordre public.1
The Supreme Court of Ireland refused to extradite in a
case in
which it thoughi that the extraditees would be physically mistreated.

Dermot Finucane and James Pius Clarke had escaped from a jail in
Northern Ireland and had gone to the Republic of Ireland, where the
United Kingdom sought their extradition. The Supreme Court of

Ireland found that there was a "probable risk" that they would be
beaten if they were 9returned
to that prison, and on that basis refused
7
to extradite them.'
Similar concerns about due process prompted the AttorneyGeneral of Ireland to refuse to seek the extradition of a man sought
by the United Kingdom on an allegation of providing weapons to the

Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland. 198 The Attorney-General said that extensive publicity about the case in the United Kingdom made it unlikely that an impartial jury could be seated. 199
When a requesting state violates the human rights of an extraditee, it is violating not only an obligation to the individual it injures, but also an obligation to all other states. Human rights norms
are obligations at the inter-state level. By virtue of human rights law,
states agree with other states that they will treat individuals according to certain standards.
The fact that human rights obligations run not only to the individual but also to the state stems from the concept that protection of
human rights benefits all states. The United Nations Charter's provi-

sion on human rights states:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among na194 Id. at 310. The government attorney had questioned the propriety of extraditing
even if the requesting state had agreed not to impose the death penalty, arguing that such
an agreement would bind only the executive branch of the Turkish government, but not its
judiciary. Id. at 308 (conclusions of Mr. Bonichot, government attorney).
195 In re Delmarle, Judgment of Feb. 1, 1951, Cour d'appel, Douai, 1951 J.C.P. II No.
6493 (cited in In re Fidan, Judgment of Feb. 27, 1987, Conseil d'Etat, 1987 D.S. Jur. 305,
306); In re Maneti,Judgment ofJan. 7, 1987, Cour d'appel, Paris, noted in 93 REVUE G.NERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 462-63 (1989). Others have held to the contrary. Id.
at 463-64.

196 Fidan, 1987 D.S. Jur. at 306 (conclusions of Mr. Bonichot, government attorney).
197 Irish High Court Bars Extraditing2 in I.R.A., N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1990, at A3, col. 4;
Anger as Irish Judges Free Two Terrorists, The Times (London), Mar. 14, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
198 The Times (London), Dec. 14, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
199 Id. at 6, col. 1 (statement released by Attorney-General John Murray).
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tions based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all ....200

Thus, the Charter views human rights enforcement as a precondition
for amicable relations among states. Similarly, the International
Court of Justice has recognized that human rights law involves obligations erga omnes (among all states). 20 1 A state is obligated to every
other state to comply with human rights norms.
This rule, that states must be concerned about compliance by
other states, is not unique to human rights law. While states are not
responsible for violations of international law committed by other
states, they are responsible if they provide assistance that facilitates a
violation by another state.2 0 2 The United Nations Security Council,
for example, required states to impose diplomatic and economic
sanctions on Southern Rhodesia after a government was set up there
in violation of the self-determination right of its majority population. 20 3 The Council's rationale was that if states continued normal
relations with Southern Rhodesia, they would be assisting the government of Southern Rhodesia in its violation of the rights of its
people.
Human rights law provides an appropriate standard by which to
assess the treatment that the extraditee might be given in the requesting state. One problem for the United States federal courts is
that they have not taken the position that the guarantees provided by
the Constitution are binding on the requesting state in its treatment
of the extraditee. In Gallina, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit referred instead to "a federal court's sense of
20 4
decency."
It is not clear what the "federal court's sense of decency" standard might involve. It could mean that the court was in effect using
due process of law but by a different name. Human rights law would
seem, however, to provide an appropriate standard because human
rights law is binding on the United States. The United States courts
are, as previously indicated, bound to apply human rights law when it
art. 55.
201 Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co. (BeIg. v. U.S.), 1970 I.CJ. 32 (Feb. 5,
1970).
202 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 27, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), at 187-96, U.N. Doc.
A/33/10 (1978), reprinted in [1978] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. 78-80, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/ser.A/1978/Add. 1(pt. 2) [hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility]. See
also Quigley, Complicity in InternationalLaw: A New Direction in the Law of State Responsibility, 57
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 77, 95-104 (1986).
203 S.C. Res. 232, 21 U.N. SCOR at 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/21/Rev.1 (1966).
204 Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960).
200 U.N. CHARTER
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is relevant to cases that come before them. 20 5
Human rights law includes a full panoply of procedural safeguards applicable to criminal cases. A body of law has developed,
through human rights treaties and the jurisprudence of human rights
tribunals, 20 6 that requires states to meet certain standards with respect both to the kinds of acts they consider crimes and to the manner in which they treat suspects. Many human rights norms form
part of customary international law, which is part of the common
law. 20 7 Federal courts have held, for example, that they must ob-

serve the human rights norms prohibiting torture 20 8 and arbitrary
2 09
detention.
As previously noted, the French courts have approached the issue using the concept of French "public order," rather than an international law standard. They find that those principles of criminal
procedure required by France's constitution constitute principles of
"public order," and that these include the prohibition against ex
21 0
post facto legislation and the right of an accused to a defense.
Beyond constitutional provisions, the French courts say that there
are other criminal law rules of public order, but they have difficulty
identifying them. Some French courts have refused to extradite to
Italy if the extraditee had been convicted in absentia, whereas others
have agreed to extradite. 2 1' France's government attorney has acknowledged that the French "public order" concept is "uncertain
and changeable.- 2 12 No one can draw up "a complete catalogue of
what constitute rules of public order because the character of some
of them is a matter of debate. '213 Public order "evolves because
it
2 14
depends on changes in concept as regards criminal law issues.
For the federal courts in the United States, one possible approach is due process and related protective principles found in the
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court under the Bill of
Rights of the United States Constitution. This would be somewhat
similar to the use by French courts of the public order concept. As
205 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
206 E.g., the European Commission on Human Rights, the European Court of Human

Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the American Court of
Human Rights.
207 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
208 Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
209 Fernandez V. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on other grounds sub
nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (affirmed on basis
of U.S. constitutional law, but noting that its conclusion was consistent with the prohibition against arbitrary imprisonment in human rights law).
210 In re Fidan, Judgment of Feb. 27, 1987, Conseil d'Etat, 1987 D.S. Jur. 305, 307
(conclusions of Mr. Bonichot, government attorney).
211 Id. at 306-07.
212 Id. at 307.

213 Id.
214 Id.
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indicated above, however, courts of the United States have been reluctant to find that the requesting state must comply with the United
States' Bill of Rights in its treatment of the extraditee.
In Soering, however, the European Court of Human Rights did
something quite similar to utilizing the Bill of Rights to govern extraditee treatment. It said that the standards by which the United
Kingdom is itself governed, including the European Human Rights
Convention, are applicable when the United Kingdom extradites.
The United Kingdom must ensure that the requesting state follow
those standards, or at least those aspects of those standards that
were relevant in the situation. 21 5 This did not mean that Virginia
had to use the same procedures that the United Kingdom might use
to conduct an investigation and trial, and to impose and carry out
punishment. If such identity of process were required, there would
rarely be a possibility of the surrender of an extraditee. However,
the European Court said that where the standard was so basic as
whether treatment were "inhuman" or "degrading," then the United
Kingdom must ensure that the requesting state act in accordance
with the standards applicable to the United Kingdom itself.
A second approach available to federal courts in extradition
cases is the human rights standard mentioned previously. This was
the approach taken by the district court in Ahmad v. Wigen. There the
court used international human rights law as the standard by which a
violation by the requesting state of the extraditee's rights would be
determined. The argument for that approach (though no rationale is
elaborated in the district court's opinion in Ahmad v. Wigen) is that
human rights law is binding on all states, and that a state's obligations under human rights law involve not only a duty to refrain from
violating the rights of individuals, but also a duty to refrain from contributing to a human rights violation by surrendering an individual
216
to a state where a violation has a substantial chance ofoccurring.
As a third possible standard, a court of the United States might
decide to use the United States Constitution's Bill of Rights protections in determining whether to surrender an extraditee to a requesting state that would violate his rights, but use human rights law as an
aid in determining the content of the United States constitutional
provisions. This is a process which courts of the United States have
frequently used to determine the content of constitutional provisions
2 17
for domestic application.
215 Soering v. United Kingdom, 195 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
83, 87, reprinted in 28
I.L.M. 1069 (1989).
216 See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
217 See Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection
Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 4-5 (1983); Hassan, The Doctrine of Incorporation:New Vistasfor
the Enforcement ofInternationalHuman Rights?, 5 HUM. RTS. Q 68, 83 (1983); Henkin, Rights:
American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 413-20 (1979); Paust, On Human Rights. The
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All three methods are likely to achieve comparable results in
most instances. Any egregious violation of rights will be prohibited
by the United States Constitution or by human rights law.

m.

The Likelihood of Anticipated IMl Treatment

In some instances a court in the requested state is confronted
with a human rights violation that has already occurred in the requesting state. In the more typical situation, however, the court is
confronted with evidence that ill treatment will occur after surrender. If the court is to consider this evidence as relevant, it must determine whether a violation is likely to occur. This raises the
question of what standard of likelihood the court should use. Possible standards could range from a virtual certainty that the violation
will occur to, at the other extreme, a slight possibility that it will
occur.
In Soering, the United Kingdom argued that it should not have to
concern itself with potential violations by the United States, but that
if it had to, then only those violations that were "certain, imminent
and serious. ' 21 8 It said that the evidence would have to demonstrate
beyond reasonable doubt, that ill treatment would ensue. 2 19
Apparently, Soering, if convicted of any degree of murder,
would meet one element set by Virginia law for capital murder,
namely, killing more than one person. 2 20 There remained, however,
the question of whether he would be found guilty, and the European
Court did not have access to all the incriminating and exculpatory
evidence that might be presented at a trial of Soeing in Virginia.
During extradition proceedings in the United Kingdom, a forensic psychiatrist examined Soering and testified that he suffered from
"an abnormality of mind due to inherent causes" that "substantially
impaired his mental responsibility for his acts."' 22 1 This mental condition raised the possibility that Soering might be acquitted by reason of insanity, or that if he were convicted, it might be a mitigating
circumstance in sentencing. Soering's age was also a factor that
might be a mitigating circumstance. He was nineteen at the time of
the offense, and the fact that a convicted person is young is typically
deemed a mitigating factor in a capital punishment decision. 2 22 In
addition, Virginia law required as a condition of imposition of capital
Use of Human Rights Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic

Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543, 609-11 (1989). Canadian courts too have used human
rights law to determine the content of rights protected domestically. See Claydon, The
Application of InternationalHuman Rights Law by Canadian Courts, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 727, 729

(1981).

218 Soering, 195 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
219 Id.
220 Id. at $ 12.

221 Id. at
222 Id. at

21.
11, 44-46.

83.
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punishment-even after conviction of capital murder-a showing
either that the crime reflected "vileness" or that the offender exhibited "future dangerousness. '2 23 It was not clear that either of these
would be found, particularly in light of Soering's mental condition.
The European Court of Human Rights said that the United
Kingdom must concern itself with the potential violations "where
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person
concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting country."'2 24 The court found that the United Kingdom
would violate the Convention if it extradited Soering, despite all of
the obstacles in the path of imposing on him a death sentence.
In Ahmad v. Wigen, the district court posed the issue as whether
the extraditee "can demonstrate probable exposure" to treatment
that would violate human rights norms. 22 5 This is more stringent
than the "real risk" standard used by the European Court in Soering.
A standard of probability is overly strict. Particularly in cases
involving potential torture, it is a difficult standard to meet. In refugee law, where a similar issue arises, a lower standard of proof is
used. Refugees qualify for political asylum if they will be persecuted
in their state of origin. Under international law, a state is prohibited
from returning a refugee to a state "where his life or freedom would
22 6
be threatened" on account of his race or certain other factors.
This standard is written into U.S. law as "a well-founded fear of persecution," 2 27 which the United States Supreme Court reads to require a showing of something less than a probability of
persecution. 2 28 The Supreme Court's standard is akin to the "real
risk" standard used by the European Court. If there is a "real risk"
that an extraditee's rights will be violated, extradition should not be
ordered.
States that are reluctant to extradite because of the anticipated
treatment of the extraditee have frequently sought assurances from
the requesting state. In In re Flores, an extradition requested by Chile
from Argentina on a capital charge, Argentine courts were not prepared to order extradition because Argentina had abolished the
death penalty. The Supreme Court of Chile indicated that it would
223 Id. at

43.

224 Id. at 91.
225 Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aft'd, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d
Cir. 1990).
226 Convention Relating to the Status of RefugeesJuly 28, 1951, art. 33, 189 U.N.T.S.
137.
227 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A).
228 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (stating that "one can certainly
have a well-founded fear of an event happening when there is less than a 50% chance of
the occurrence taking place"); Note, Immigration & Naturalization Service v. CardozaFonseca: Liberalizing United States Asylum Law, 10 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. 295, 313 (1988).
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endeavor to comply with Argentina's wishes that the death penalty
not be imposed. An Argentine court ruled that this was not a sufficient assurance. The Argentine Supreme Court, on appeal, held that
extradition should be ordered only if the Chilean executive agreed to
22 9
commute any death sentence that might be imposed.
In Alhmad v. Wigen, the district court relied heavily on an assurance from the Ministry of Justice of Israel that the extraditee would
not be tortured. 23 0 In Soering, the United Kingdom secured an
agreement from the United States that the death penalty would not
be imposed. 23 ' Many extradition treaties give a requested state the
right to demand, as a condition of surrender, that the requesting
23 2
state not impose the death penalty.
Courts in the requesting state have not always acted in accordance with the agreement given by the requesting state. For example,
in 1884 Portugal extradited a man to Spain on .condition that the
death penalty not be imposed. The Spanish court imposed the death
penalty, but the executive then commuted the penalty. 233 Similarly,
in Soering, even after the United States assured the United Kingdom
that the death penalty would not be imposed, the Virginia court proceeded with the original indictment, which included a capital
charge. 23 4 Before trial, however, the capital charge was dropped,
23 5
and Soering was tried for non-capital murder.
Thus, the status of agreements regarding the treatment of extraditees is not free from doubt. They constitute agreements by the
requesting states to act in certain ways. It is not clear, however, that
they bind the courts of the requesting states. If it appeared that the
extraditee was about to be executed, it is not clear what remedy the
requested state would have to stop the execution. If the extraditee
were in fact executed, it is not clear what recourse the requested
state would have. Though the reliability of these agreements may be
questioned, it is probable that they serve to decrease the likelihood
of particular rights violations. It is therefore appropriate that these
agreements be taken into consideration by the courts.
IV.

Individual Rights in Extradition Treaties

As indicated above, extradition primarily involves a relation between states, but the rights of the extraditee have also been given
229 In re Flores, 5 Ann. Dig. 289 (C.J.N. 1929).
230 See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.

231 Wash. Post, Aug. 2, 1989, at A24, col. 1.
232 See infra note 255.

233 In re Fidan, Judgment of Feb. 27, 1987, Conseil d'Etat, 1987 D.S. Jur. 305, 308
(conclusions of Mr. Bonichot, government attorney) (citing 1987 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 755).

234 Quigley & Shank, supra note 170, at 247 n.40.
235 Wash. Post, Sept. 5, 1990, at C3, col. 6.
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consideration. Extradition law contains numerous features that protect extraditees. As human rights law developed in the twentieth
century, extradition protections increased.2 3 6 States have chosen the
states with which to conclude treaties in part on the basis of their
view of how those states are likely to treat extraditees. States typically have not concluded treaties with states in whose legal process
they lack confidence. It has been said that extradition is "an act of
23 7
confidence in the system of justice of the requesting state."
In the eighteenth century extradition was typically handled-in
the United States and in other states--exclusively by the executive
branch of government, with no judicial role.23 8 This practice was
criticized on the ground that the political branch of government
might not objectively peruse the evidence of guilt. 2 3 9 In the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842,240 the United States and Britain
1
agreed that they would afford a judicial hearing to extraditees. 24
24
2
Most states today do likewise.
The purpose of the judicial hearing
is to provide fair treatment for the extraditee. 24 3
In the United States, as in other states, an extraditee has certain
rights during the extradition process. 2 44 An extraditee is entitled to
seek habeas corpus review of a magistrate's finding of extraditability. 245 If the authorities have granted immunity from prosecution in the United States or abroad, 24 6 the United States may not
thereafter extradite the individual because "the breach by the government of an enforceable prosecutor-defendant agreement violates
'24 7
the defendant's right to due process of law."
Many extradition treaties provide that a state is not required to
extradite a person if it has already tried the person for the offense in
question (the rule of non bis in idm). 248 This rule protects the indi236 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE 405 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1986).

237 Fidan, 1987 D.S. Jur. at 307 (conclusions of Mr. Bonichot, government attorney)
(citing Travers, Le Droit PnalInternational, 4 Sirey No. 2133 (1921)).
238 M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 505 (1974).
239 See I J. MOORE, supra note 21, at 90 (1891).

240 Convention as to Boundaries, Suppression of Slave Trade, and Extradition, Aug.
9, 1842, 8 Stat. 572, T.S. No. 119.
241 In re Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 176, 182 (1857).
242 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 238, at 505.
243 2 A. McNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS 44 (1956) (Opinion of the Law Of-

ficers of the Crown, Oct. 4, 1815).
244 Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 348 (4th Cir. 1983) (noted in Extradition:
Habeas Corpus Relef Based on an Immunity Agreement, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 450 (1984)); Geisser
v. United States, 513 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1975).
245 Peroffv. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
246 Plaster, 720 F.2d at 344-45.
247 Id. at 352. See also In re Geisser, 627 F.2d 745, 755 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub
nom. Bauer v. United States, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
248 E.g., Extradition Treaty, Oct. 13, 1983, United States-Italy, art. 6, T.I.A.S. No.
10837.
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vidual from being placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. 24 9
Extradition treaties also typically do not require extradition if the
statute of limitations applicable in the requesting state on the offense
in question has run. 2 50 Here, the requested state forces the request25
ing state to abide by its own rules of criminal procedure. '
The rule that extradition is required only if the offense in question is an offense in the requested state 25 2 protects the extraditee
2 53
from being surrendered for trial on offenses of unusual types.
The requirement of a finding of probable cause protects the extraditee against being surrendered to a requesting state that has no
2 54
substantial evidence of guilt.
Many extradition treaties provide that if extradition is requested
on a capital charge, the requested state may seek assurances that the
requesting state will not sentence the extraditee to death. 25 5 Even in
the absence of such a provision, a requested state that itself has no
capital punishment for the offense in question has the right to refuse
to extradite if capital punishment would be imposed. 25 6 While this
provision allows the requested state to adhere to its own principles
regarding capital punishment, it also acts as a safeguard for the
extraditee.
The doctrine of specialty in extradition law also protects the
rights of an extraditee. Under this doctrine, which is reflected in
most extradition treaties, the requesting state may prosecute the extraditee only for the offenses on which extradition is sought.2 57 This
doctrine protects the integrity of the extradition treaty, because if a
requesting state could prosecute for other offenses, the limitations in
the treaty would be undermined. 25 8 The doctrine also protects the
extraditee from prosecution on additional charges and thus provides
a safeguard for the individual. 2 59 The extent of this protection is, of
course, limited in that the extraditee may have no effective remedy if
260
the requesting state in fact prosecutes on additional charges.
249 In re Fidan, Judgment of Feb. 27, 1987, Conseil d'Etat, 1987 D.S. Jur. 305, 306
(conclusions of Mr. Bonichot, government attorney).
250 E.g., Extradition Treaty, supra note 248, art. 8.
251 Fidan, 1987 D.S. Jur. at 307 (conclusions of Mr. Bonichot, government attorney).
252 Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 311 (1921).
253 Fidan, 1987 D.S. Jur. at 306 (conclusions of Mr. Bonichot, government attorney).
254 Collins, 259 U.S. at 316-17.
255 E.g., Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, art. 4, 28
U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468; Treaty Concerning Extradition, June 20, 1978, United
States-Federal Republic of Germany, art. 12,.32 U.S.T. 1485, T.I.A.S. No. 9785; European
Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. 11, Europ. T.S. No. 24.
256 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 238, at 460-61.
257 Id. at 352-53.

258 Id. at 354.
259 LEGAL AsPECTS OF EXTRADITION AMONG EUROPEAN STATES

1970).
260 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 238, at 356-57.

21 (Council of Europe
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The exception in extradition law for political offenses also protects extraditees. Most extradition treaties do not require extradition for political offenses. 2 6 1 This exception came into being in the
nineteenth century, under the impact of ideas of protecting the political freedom of the individual. The political offense exception was
connected to the concept of giving asylum to those against whom
reprisals might be taken in their home states because of their political views. 26 2 The exception reinforces the right of asylum, which
gives those who may be persecuted for political opinion a right to
refuge abroad.2 6 3 Traditionally, states have resisted surrendering individuals who may be tried less for specific acts than for their political views.
A 1985 revision of the United States-United Kingdom extradition treaty2 6 4 required a magistrate to deny extradition if the extraditee establishes
by a preponderance of the evidence that the request for extradition
has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him on account of
his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions, or that he would,
if surrendered, be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or
narestricted in his personal liberty
2 6 5by reason of his race, religion,
tionality, or political opinions.
This language was inserted by the United States Senate as an amendment to the treaty as negotiated between the United States and
United Kingdom, primarily because the revised extradition treaty restricted the political offense exception 2 66 and the senators wanted a
use of extradition to gain custody of exiled
safeguard against the
26 7
political opponents.
The 1985 provision, for the first time in any United States extradition treaty, barred extradition where the request, though based on
probable cause with respect to an extraditable offense, is motivated
by an aim of persecuting the extraditee. 26 8 Also for the first time
under any United States extradition treaty, a magistrate must deny
extradition if the extraditee would be prejudiced at trial because of
261 Id. at 371.
262 Id. at 372-75.
263 I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 175 (1971).
264 Supplementary Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985, United States-United Kingdom,
reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1104 (1985).
265 Id., art. 3(a) (as amended in 132 CONG. REC. S9120 (daily ed. July 16, 1986)).
266 132 CONG. REC. S9255 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Kerry); 132
CONG. REC. S9167 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Eagleton).
267 Note, Questions of Justice: U.S. Courts' Powers of Inquiry Under Article 3(a) of the United
States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 474, 476-78
(1987).
268 Groarke, Revolutionaries Beware: The Erosion of the Political Offense Exception Under the
1986 United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1515,
1530 (1988). Cf. In re Mylonas, 187 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ala. 1960) (in which the district
court denied extradition because it apparently believed that the extraditee was being persecuted). See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
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his "race, religion, nationality, or political opinions.

' 26 9

The magis-

trate thus must examine the trial procedures that face the extraditee
if there is reason to believe that the extraditee would be prejudiced.
The scope of such an examination is not clear. 270 It was inserted by
senators wary of the trial procedures used in Northern Ireland to try
Irish revolutionaries. 2 7 1 Senator Eagleton said that it meant only
that the extraditee would be permitted to prove that he or she would
as an individual be persecuted, and thus that the trial might not be
272
conducted fairly.
The dominant view among the senators, however, was that the
language required an examination of the fairness of the justice system under which the extraditee would be tried. 273 They saw it as
inconsistent with a concept of non-inquiry. 274 They were concerned
that the procedures used in Northern Ireland to try Irish revolutionaries lacked due process, and they wanted to prevent extradition of
Irish revolutionaries for trials in Northern Ireland until the system of

trial there was reformed. 27 5 Under this interpretation, the magistrate would be required to examine the administration of justice
broadly, to determine whether it comported with due process.
269 See supra note 265.
270 Scharf, Foreign Courts on Trial: Why U.S. Courts Should Avoid Applying the Inquiry Provision of the Supplementary U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 257, 277 (1989);
Bassiouni, The "Political Offense Exception" Revisited: Extradition Between the U.S. and the U.K.A Choice Between Friendly CooperationAmong Allies and Sound Law and Policy, 15 DENVERJ. INT'L
L. & POL'v 255, 277 (1987).
271 132 CONG. REC. S9262 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (analysis of Northern Ireland trial
procedures applied to Irish revolutionaries, read into the record by Sen. Kerry); Scharf,
supra note 270, at 264.
272 132 CONG. REC. S9167 (daily ed.July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Eagleton). Sen.
Eagleton noted that the provision
is not intended to give courts authority generally to critique the abstract fairness of foreign judicial systems. It is directed at the treatment to which this
particular person will be subjected. And it is directed at the likelihood of
prejudice by reason of race, religion, nationality, or political opinions. A
court may not deny extradition because it concludes that a foreign tribunal
does not provide every procedural safeguard provided by U.S. courts.
Rather, the test should be whether the procedures that would be applied to
the requested person, on account of his race, religion, nationality, or political
opinions, would be so unfair as to violate fundamental notions of due
process.
Id. See Groarke, supra note 268, at 1530-31.
273 Note, supra note 267, at 477; Scharf, supra note 270, at 266.
274 Groarke, supra note 268, at 1530.
275 132 CONG. REC. S9257 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Kerry). Sen.
Kerry explained:
What I and other of my colleagues on the committee found particularly disturbing was the administration's contention that the administration ofjustice
system in Northern Ireland was not only fair, but entirely justifiable under
the circumstances. Thus, the administration of justice system in Northern
Ireland has become acceptable to this administration. It is not acceptable to
the. U.S. Senate and that is the reason for article 3(a). This is the fundamental point which the courts must address once this treaty is ratified.
Id. See also 132 CONG. REc. S9260 (daily ed. July 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Biden).
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A protective provision also appears in the Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. 276 According to the Convention, a state party is generally obligated to extradite to another state party that seeks a suspect on a drug
trafficking charge, if the two states have a bilateral extradition
treaty. 2 77 However, the requested state may refuse to extradite:
where there are substantial grounds leading its judicial or other
competent authorities to believe that compliance would facilitate the
prosecution or punishment of any person on account of his race,
religion, nationality or political opinions, or would cause prejudice
278
for any of those reasons to any person affected by the request.

V.

Implications for Extradition to the United States

The broad use of human rights considerations in extradition law
is relevant not only when the United States is the requested state, but
also when it is the requesting state. This point was made dramatically in the Soering case, 279 in which the United States was unable to
gain extradition because of its use of death row incarceration. After
the European Court ordered the United Kingdom not to extradite
Soering on a capital charge, the United States agreed that Soering
would not be sentenced to death, and the United Kingdom surrendered him on that basis.2 80 The United States may anticipate similar
difficulties in other death penalty cases.
State practice against imposition of the death penalty has increased in recent years. Many -ofthe United States' extradition treaties permit the other state to seek an assurance from the United
States that a person sought will not be subjected to capital punishment. 28 ' In Western Europe, most states have ratified a treaty in
which they have agreed not to use capital punishment in peacetime. 2 82 At the United Nations, a draft treaty calls for the abolition
283

of capital punishment.
Apart from capital punishment per se, human rights treaties
276 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,
Dec. 19, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/15, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989).
277 Id., art. 6(2).
278 Id., art. 6(6).
279 Soering v. United Kingdom, 195 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
1069 (1989). See supra notes 163-75 and accompanying text.
280 Quigley & Shank, supra note 170, at 244 n.18.
281 See supra note 255.
282 Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, entered into force Mar. 1,
1985, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 538 (1983), 6 HUM. RTS. L.J. 77 (1985), 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 382
(1985). Article I states: "The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed." Id., art. 1.
283 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 15, 1989, G.A. Res. 128, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 206, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/128 (1989) (signed by 19 states and ratified by 5 as of Oct. 23, 1990; ten ratifications required).
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prohibit the execution of persons who were younger than eighteen at
the time of the offense

28 4

or over seventy, 28 5 and international bod-

ies have moved in the direction of calling for a prohibition against
the execution of the mentally retarded. 28 6 A number of persons who
were under eighteen at the time of the offense have been sentenced
to death in recent years in the United States, 28 7 and many sentenced
288
to death are believed to be mentally retarded.
Additionally, capital cases in the United States present a potential violation of the prohibition in human rights law against racial
discrimination. Discrimination on the basis of race-in capital punishment and generally-is prohibited by conventional and customary
human rights law. 28 9 At least one study has suggested that capital
punishment in the United States is imposed more frequently where
290
the victim of the crime was white than where the victim was black.
This raises the question of whether, in the many discretionary decisions that ultimately lead to imposition of capital punishment, racial
bias plays a role. According to the United States Supreme Court,
before a capital sentence will be reversed for racial bias, it must be
demonstrated either that those who exercised discretion in the instant case acted out of racial bias, or that the legislature maintained
the death penalty "because of an anticipated racially discriminatory
29
effect." 1
Another potential human rights violation in United States death
penalty procedure is the method of selecting the jury. In a voir dire
procedure, all prospective jurors are questioned about their opinions
on the death penalty. Those who say that they oppose it, such that
they could not impose it, are excused from service on the jury.
Although the United States Supreme Court has approved this proce284 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 141, art. 6(5); Arnett, Death at an Early Age: InternationalLaw Arguments Against the Death PenaltyforJuveniles, 57
U. CIN. L. REV. 245, 252 (1988).
285 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 159, art. 4(5).
286 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: THE DEATH PENALTY: A HUMAN

RIGHTS ISSUE 42 (1989).
287 E.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
288 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 286, at 42.
289 RESTATEMENT (REVISED)

OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 702(i) (1987); European Convention, supra note 66, art. 14; Frowein, Experiences with the
European Convention on Human Rights, 5 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 196 (1989).
29o Gross & Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing
and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 94 (1984).
291 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (emphasis in original). The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights decided that without more evidence it would not
find the death penalty as imposed in Louisiana to constitute a violation of the human rights
prohibition against racial discrimination. In re Celestine, Case 10.031, INTER-AM. C.H.R.
41, OEA/ser. L/V/I 1.76, doc. 44 (1989), noted in Cerna & Young, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Death Penalty, 34 FED. BAR NEWS J. 398, 402 (1987). See also
N.Y. Times, July 20, 1987, at A14, col. 1.
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dure, 2 92 it is believed to result in the exclusion from the jury of liberal-minded persons and produce a jury that is more racially
prejudiced than a non-capital jury and more likely to convict. United
States Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall said that deathqualified jurors have a "pro-prosecution bias" 293 and are "more
likely to believe that a defendant's failure to testify is indicative of his
guilt, more hostile to the insanity defense, more mistrustful of defense attorneys, and less concerned about the danger of erroneous
convictions. '29 4 According to Justice Marshall, "[t]he very process
of death qualification focuses attention on the death penalty before
the trial has even begun" and as a result "predispose[s] the jurors
that survive it to believe that the defendant is guilty."'295 This conclusion was confirmed by a study of the impact of death-qualifying
questioning.

29 6

The United States Supreme Court said it would "assume that
'death qualification' in fact produces juries somewhat more 'conviction-prone' than 'non-death-qualified' juries," 2 9 7 but held that "the
Constitution does not prohibit the States from 'death qualifying' juries in capital cases." ' 298 In contrast, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights calls for a "fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal. '29 9 Death qualified
juries may not meet this standard.
Another potential problem in capital, and to some extent in
other, criminal cases is appellate review. The scope of review on ap-

peal is more limited in the United States than in many other states
292 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-83 (1986); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 516-18 (1968).
293 Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 188 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Thompson, Cowan,
Ellsworth & Harrington, Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The Translation of
Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 95, 103 (1984) (experiment showing that persons who, on the basis of their beliefs, would be eligible to serve on a capital jury construed evidence more favorably to the prosecution than did those who would be
ineligible).
294 Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 188 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Ellsworth, Bukaty,
Cowan & Thompson, The Death-QualifiedJury and the Defense of Insanity, 8 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 81, 88-89 (1984) (experiment showing that persons, who on the basis of their beliefs, would be eligible to serve on a capital jury are substantially less likely to accept a plea
of insanity than those who would be ineligible).
295 Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 188 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
296 Honey, On the Selection of CapitalJuries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-Qualification
Process, 8 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 121, 126-28 (1984) (experiment showing that persons who
were subjected to the death-qualification process are more likely to convict and to sentence to death).
297 Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 173.
298 Id. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found no violation of the
right to a fair trial. In re Celestine, Case 10.031, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 41, 44-45, OEA/ser.
L/V/I 1.76, doc. 44 (1989).
299 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 141, art. 14(1). See
also European Convention, supra note 66, art. 6(1) ("an independent and impartial tribunal"); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 159, art. 8(1) ("a competent,
independent, and impartial tribunal").
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because appellate courts in the United States typically do not inquire
deeply into the facts as found by the trial court. 30 0 Thus, if the trial
court makes a questionable factual finding, an appellate court is not
likely to change it.
An example of the limited scope of appellate review is State v.
Apanovitch,3 0 ' in which a woman was raped and murdered late at
night in her apartment, apparently by an intruder. Apanovitch was
convicted and sentenced to death on the basis of evidence that he
was a house painter and had been painting the woman's apartment
earlier on the day of her death, that a contract to paint the apartment
was found inside the apartment, and that he had expressed to neighbors a sexual interest in the victim. 30 2 Evidence was presented at

trial that blood of type A was found in the victim's vagina, and Apanovitch had blood of that type, but it appeared that the victim did as
well. 30 3 Thus the blood could have been that of the victim. There
was no evidence that Apanovitch was present in or near the victim's
apartment at the time of the crime. Without indicating which evidence supported a finding of guilt, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld
30 4
the conviction.
Another potential violation of human rights norms in United
States criminal proceedings is the fact that, with respect to a number
of defenses to crime, the accused is required to prove innocence. In
some states of the United States, a defendant charged with murder
who says that he was provoked by the victim must prove provocation
by a preponderance of the evidence, 305 and in some states the accused also has the burden of proving insanity,3 0 6 duress, 30 7 and, in
30 8
one state, self-defense.
Under international human rights law, an accused enjoys a presumption of innocence. 30 9 Outside the common law countries, it is
300 Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 373 (1906); Crumpton v. United States, 138
U.S. 361, 362 (1891).
301 33 Ohio St. 3d 19 (1987).
302 Id. at 30-31 (H. Brown, Sweeney, Locher, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
303 Id.
304 Id. at 24. The decision was a four to three vote. The three dissenting judges
would have overturned the verdict for lack of evidence.
305 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206-07 (1977).
306 See Annotation, Modern Status of Rules as to Burden and Sufficiency of Proof of Mental

Irresponsibility in Criminal Cases, 17 A.L.R.3d 146 (1968). See also Quigley, The Need to Abolish
Defenses to Crime: A Modest Proposal to Solve the Problem of Burden of Persuasion, 14 VT. L. REV.
335, 337 (1990).
307 See 22A CJ.S. Criminal Law § 52 (1989); 2 P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES
350-51 (1984).
308 Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 235-36 (1987). See Quigley, Ohio's Unique Rule on
Burden of Persuasionfor Self-Defense: Unraveling the Legislative and Judicial Tangle, 20 TOLEDO L.
REV. 105, 116-18 (1989).
309 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 141, art. 14(2);
European Convention, supra note 66, art. 6(2); American Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 159, art. 6(2).
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almost universally true that, where the accused raises a defense, the
prosecution must prove that it is not applicable.3 10 Thus, the presumption of innocence as understood in most states means that the
accused may not be required to prove a defense. If an accused must
prove a defense, uncertainty by the trier of fact of the validity of the
defense often results in conviction. In other words, conviction occurs when the trier of fact is uncertain about guilt. In contrast, the
presumption of innocence means that there may be no conviction
unless guilt is established to a high degree of certainty.
Each of the preceding questionable practices in the United
States could weigh against extradition to the United States. Imposition of the death penalty, race discrimination in sentencing, death
qualification of juries, limited appellate review, and misplaced burdens of proof all pose potential human rights problems. Thus, the
fact that more weight is being given to human rights considerations
in extradition decisions may make it more difficult for the United
States to gain extradition in a variety of situations.
VI.

The Importance of Considering Human Rights

The rule of non-inquiry has one legitimate field of application.
A court of the United States should not have to determine that a
requesting state will follow procedures identical to those of the
United States with respect to an extraditee. Similarly, courts abroad
should not condition extradition to the United States on a requirement that United States courts follow procedures like their own in
trying criminal cases. Such a requirement would assure that extradition would rarely be granted and would thus undermine the entire
system of extradition. Even if substantial differences in procedure
are found, that should not bar extradition.
Apart from this issue of differences in trial procedure, it is not
clear that a rule of non-inquiry exists in the federal courts. Although
courts and commentators have said that there is such a rule,3 1' the
3 12
practice is sufficiently uneven to cast doubt as to its existence.
Courts have frequently explored an extraditee's allegation about potential unjust treatment and have found him extraditable only after
satisfying themselves that there is no reason to believe that unjust
treatment will be given.
If a rule of non-inquiry exists, it is inconsistent with human
rights law. A leading specialist in extradition law has written that
"[t]he emergence of the individual as a recognized participant in the
310

Quigley, supra note 306, at 342.

See Scharf, supra note 270, at 268.
See, e.g., Bassiouni, Extradition Reform Legislation in the United States: 1981-1983, 17
AKRON L. REV. 495, 571 (1984) (stating that there is "based on'increasing dicta in the
court opinions reason to believe that the rule of non-inquiry could be eroded given the
appropriate case").
311
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processes of extradition and the applicability of internationally protected human rights are likely to curtail if not eliminate the rule of
noninquiry." 31 3 The manner in which the requesting state is likely to
treat an extraditee should be considered where there is reason to
believe that it may violate standards recognized by human rights law
as necessary for a fair proceeding.
Unless this inquiry is made, a requested state contributes to a
violation of human rights. It becomes an accomplice of the state that
directly violates rights. In recent decades, it has become accepted
that a state must not facilitate a violation of international law by another state, 31 4 and this principle includes international law obligations concerning human rights. 31 5 States thus have a responsibility
to ensure that they do not contribute to a human rights violation by
another state.
Extradition law in the United States has long reflected concern
for the rights of extraditees. The procedures followed by the federal
courts to decide extraditability have involved significant safeguards.
The federal courts have, albeit in a halting and uneven fashion, exhibited concern for the rights of an extraditee in the requesting state.
Courts have frequently purported to follow a rule of non-inquiry
while in fact giving consideration to anticipated mistreatment. The
emergence of human rights law has reinforced the federal courts'
concern and has made it obligatory. The federal courts are required
by human rights law to bar extradition to a state that may violate the
extraditee's rights.
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M. BAssbouNI, supra note 238, at 466.

314 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
315 Soering v. United Kingdom, 195 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
28 I.L.M. 1069 (1989).
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